Reformation of the EC Competition Policy on Vertical Restraints by Terhorst, Georg




Reformation of the EC Competition Policy on
Vertical Restraints
Georg Terhorst
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/njilb
Part of the International Law Commons
This Perspective is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business by an authorized administrator of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly
Commons.
Recommended Citation
Georg Terhorst, Reformation of the EC Competition Policy on Vertical Restraints, 21 Nw. J. Int'l L. & Bus. 343 (2000-2001)
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The Reformation of the EC




After nearly forty years, the European Commission ("Commission")
has recognized the need for a revision of the Community's policy governing
vertical agreements. The stage is set for change: single market legislation is
largely in place, the Commission block exemption regulations governing
vertical restraints expired at the end of 1999,1 and methods of distributing
have undergone major changes.
"Georg Terhorst received his LL.M degree from Northwestern University School of Law
in May, 2000. He would like to thank Lucas Peeperkom for his friendly suggestions and
helpful comments while at the Competition Directorate-General in Bruxelles and during the
writing of this article.
'The previous block exemption regulations expired on December 31, 1999 and in order
to prevent a legal vacuum, the new Regulation in Article 12(1) extended the previous block
exemption regulations until June 1, 2000. Existing agreements will continue to benefit from
the current block exemption regulations until December 31, 2001. This leaves the under-
takings affected by the reformation a transitional period of nineteen months.
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On December 22, 1999 the Commission finally adopted the Commis-
sion Regulation (EC) No 2790/1999 on the Application of Article 81(3)2 of
the Treaty to Categories of Vertical Agreements and Concerted Practices.3
This Regulation entered into force on January 1, 2000 and applied from
June 1, 2000.4 As the final piece of a complex reformation process, the
Commission adopted the accompanying Guidelines on May 24, 2000. The
Guidelines will be revised in four years' time, in view of market develop-
ments and experience gathered by the European Commission in applying
the new policy.
The Commission, equipped with the necessary powers by the European
Union's Council meeting in Luxembourg on April 29, 1999,,published on
September 24, 1999 a draft of the new exemption regulation. This began
the legislative procedure-including the final phase of public consultations
with representatives from trade and industry institutions-for the adoption
of the new rules applicable to vertical agreements.6
2 Article 81 of the EC Treaty states that:
1. The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market: all agreements be-
tween undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices which may
affect trade between Member States and which have as their object or effect the prevention, restric-
tion or distortion of competition within the common market, and in particular those which:
(a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other trading conditions;
(b) limit or control production, markets, technical development, or investment;
(c) share markets or sources of supply;
(d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing
them at a competitive disadvantage;
(e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of supplementary ob-
ligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection with the sub-
ject of such contracts.
2. Any agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to this Article shall be automatically void.
3. The provisions ofparagraph 1 may, however, be declared inapplicable in the case of:
- any agreement or category of agreements between undertakings;
- any decision or category of decisions by associations of undertakings;
- any concerted practice or category of concerted practices, which contributes to improving the pro-
duction or distribution of goods or to promoting technical or economic progress, while allowing con-
sumers a fair share of the resulting benefit, and which does not
(a) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not indispensable to the attainment
of these objectives;
(b) afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in respect of a substantial part
of the products in question.
Treaty Establishing The European Community, art. 81, O.J. (C224) 28 (1992) [hereinafter
EC Treaty].
3 See Commission Regulation 2790/1999, 1999 O.J. (L 336) 21.
4 See id. at 25, art. 13. Article 12(1) shall apply from January 1, 2000. See id.
5 The Guidelines are available online at http://europa.eu.int./commcompetition
/antitrustlother.html.
6 See 1999 0.3. (C 270) 7. For an illustration of the potential significance of such a con-
sultation process, see the history of the adoption process of the technology transfer block ex-
emption. See 1996 O.J. (L 31)2.
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The Green Paper on Vertical Restraints in EC Competition Policy
("Green Paper" or "Paper"), adopted by the Commission on January 22,
71997 after two years of preparation time, started this reformation process.
The Paper contained four policy options plus two sub-variants to amend the
previous competition rules based on the analysis made in the Green Paper.
8
However, the Commission did not consider itself limited to these proposals
but explicitly stated the possibility of a combination of these options in dif-
ferent ways and the openness to new ideas.9 On the basis of the analysis
contained in the Paper, the Commission held an official hearing and initi-
ated a wide-ranging debate on the proposals' economic and legal ramifica-
tions.10 The Commission's Competition Directorate-General ("Competition
DG")1 reviewed the opinions of all parties-the Member States, the Euro-
pean Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee, industry, distributors
and consumers--concerned with this proposal in a wide-ranging consulta-
tion exercise.
As a follow-up to the Green Paper, the Commission adopted the Com-
munication from the Commission on the Application of the Community
Competition Rules to Vertical Restraints ("Communication") on September
30, 1998.12 Therein, the Commission set out the framework of the new
policy in the field of vertical restraints. The Commission, pursuing the ob-
jectives of protection of competition and market integration, designed the
new policy to deliver reduced costs to industry, provide a greater commer-
cial flexibility and increase legal security for the enterprises. 13 The new
7 Green Paper on Vertical Restraints in the EC Competition Policy, COM(96)721 final;
see also European Commission's Press-Release IP 97/35. Initially the Green Paper was
scheduled for March 1996. See Fiona M. Carlin "Vertical Restraints: Time for Change?" 5
ECLR 283,283 (1996).
8 See id. at 75, ch. viii.
9 See id. at Exec. Summary, para. 38.
1o See Franz-J6rg Semler and Michael Bauer, Die neue EU-
Gruppenfreistellungsverordnungflir vertikale Wettbewerbsbeschriinkungen - Folgenfir die
Rechtspraxis , Europaische Zeitschrift filr Wirtschaftsrecht 193, 194 (2000).
1 The mission of the Competition Directorate General is to establish and implement a
coherent competition policy for the European Union. The Competition DG's main areas of
activity are: antitrust (i.e. the Application of Articles 81 & 82 of the European Community
Treaty and Article 65 of the European Coal and Steel Community Treaty), merger control
(i.e. Application of Council Regulation 4064/89 on the Control of Concentrations Between
Undertakings and of Article 66 of the European Coal and Steel Community Treaty), liberali-
zation and state intervention (i.e. the Application of Articles 31 and 86 of the European
Community Treaty; and State Aid, the Application of Articles 86 and 87-89 of the European
Community Treaty, and Articles 4, 56 and 95 of the European Coal and Steel Community
Treaty). The Competition DG also deals with the international dimension of competition
policy, as partner of the industrially developed countries (i.e. USA, Japan, Canada, etc.) or as
a counselor to countries with transforming economies (i.e. countries of Eastern and Central
Europe).
12 See COM(98)544 final; 1998 OJ (C 365) 3.
13 See 1998 O.J. (C 365) 3.
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policy should originally have been adopted by .the end of 1999 and was de-
signed to enter into force on January 1, 2000,14 but was delayed for six
months.
15
The single market offers an opportunity for entities from the Member
States as well as from Non-Member States to enter into new markets that
previously may have been closed to them because of state barriers. 16 This
penetration of new markets is a risky endeavor that requires large invest-
ments of time and monetary resources. Such an entry can often be facili-
tated by agreements between the producer who wants to break into a new
market and a local distributor. A specialized distributor can often gain
economies of scale 17 and scope18 by distributing many products simultane-
ously. Additionally, a local distributor with specialized knowledge of the
markets in which the product is to be launched can also contribute to in-
crease the chance of success of the endeavor and reduce risks. In this re-
spect, vertical restraints, such as exclusive agreements, tend to increase the
profits obtained by these relationships. They will also stimulate entry by
other potential distributors and producers which promotes efficiency in the
long run.
Karel van Miert, the European Competition Commissioner from 1993
until 1999, stressed upon the adoption of the Communication on September
30, 1998, that:
The aim of the present policy proposal is to shift toward a more economic ap-
proach while increasing the overall level of legal security for companies by
providing them with a "safe haven" within which it is no longer necessary for
them to assess the validity of their agreement under EU competition rules. It
will restore freedom to contract for the vast majority of companies while im-
proving the protection of competition to the benefit of consumers. This new
policy is an important orientation which will be followed in other areas of
competition law where the Commission needs to modernize its rules. 19
With its 30 percent market share threshold, the new block exemption
regulation provides a safe haven for small and medium sized companies
that will enjoy more freedom and legal security in the drafting process of
vertical agreements. Larger entities, however, with a market share around
" See Press Release IP/991699, European Commission, at http://europa.eu.int/en/comm/c
ompetitionindex-en.html (Sept. 24, 1999).
15 See Commission Regulation 2790/1999, art. 12(1), 1999 O.J. (L 336) 21, 25; Press
Release IP/99/1045, European Commission, at http://europa.eu.intlen/comm/competition/In
dex en.html (Dec. 22, 1999).
16 Cf. Green Paper, supra note 7, at ii., Exec. Summary.
17 Reduction in cost per unit resulting from increased production, realized through opera-
tional efficiencies.
1s Cost savings achieved by one company conducting business in two or more areas that
would not be achieved by separate companies conducting business in each of those areas.
19 Press Release 1P198/853, European Commission 1-2, at http://europa.eu.intlen/comm/c
ompetition/index-en.html (Sept. 30, 1998).
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or even higher than 30 percent, have to carry more responsibility under the
new rules. They themselves have to make an honest assessment of their
market share and their vertical agreements in light of the new rules. The
Commission emphasized their willingness to discuss agreements with com-
panies to ensure that they were on the right track, but undertakings will not
need to give notice and in fact are discouraged from notifying the Commis-
sion of their agreements as they had done before.20 The new rules are de-
signed to free up competition officials, who previously had to plough
through piles of paper work on many innocuous agreements, to investigate
the really important anti-competitive deals.
In the present article, I present the main issues surrounding the reform
process, its reasoning and the result it brought to the European Commu-
nity's ("EC") competition policy on vertical restraints. Furthermore, I
summarize some of the reactions by other bodies of the EC and industry
sectors toward this reform process. Finally, I will discuss the responses by
business toward these changes in the EC rules to vertical restraints and the
way enterprises will operate in the Member States of the EC.
II. INTRODUCTION TO EC COMPETITION LAW
The EC's competition law applicable to undertakings2 1 is built on Arti-
cles 81 and 82 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community (the
"Treaty") 22 and Council Regulation No. 17/62/EEC ("Regulation No.
2 0 See Brussels to Ease Rules on Exclusive Sales Deals, FIN. TIMES WEB-ARCHIVE,
Dec. 22, 1999, at http://www.ft.com (on file with author).
21 The European Court of Justice and the Commission have defined "undertaking" as en-
compassing not only a company but an individual that "engages in economic activities." See
Reuter v. BASF AG, 1976 O.J. (L 254) 40, [1976] 2 C.M.L.R. D44, at D55; AIOP v. Bey-
rard 1976 O.J. (L 6) 8, [1976] 1 C.M.L.R. D14. In this article I use the terms undertaking,
entity and business company interchangeably. Agreements with non-commercial final con-
sumers do not fall under the new block exemption since the regulation applies according to
Article 2(1) only to the extent that such agreements contain restrictions of competition fal-
ling within the scope of Article 81(l). Article 81(1) only applies to agreements between un-
dertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices. See
Guidelines, supra note 5, at 5, ch. iii, pt. 24. In contrast, the block exemption regulation
might be applicable, to the extent that the final consumer is an undertaking. See id.
22 Unless otherwise stated all Articles refer to the Treaty establishing the European
Community as amended by the Amsterdam Treaty. The Amsterdam Treaty, which entered
into force on May 1, 1999, provided for the amendment of the EC Treaty by altering its
content, inserting new provisions, and also renumbering the majority of the existing provi-
sions. Article 81(1) and (2) essentially forbids any agreements which prevent, restrict, or
distort competition, such as vertical agreements which establish exclusive relationships be-
tween producers and distributors. Section 3 allows for exemptions to these rules if the
agreements contribute to "improving the production or distribution of goods or to promoting
technical or economic progress, while allowing a consumers a fair share of the resulting
benefit." See generally EC Treaty, supra note 2.
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17").23 These rules are not only concerned with competition matters, but
also seek to implement a broader range of industrial, social, and political
policies, such as economic integration of the various Member States.24 The
tradition of economic integration as the overriding purpose of European
competition policy goes back to the European Coal and Steel Community
Treaty ("ECSC Treaty"). The preamble of the ECSC Treaty states that:
To substitute for historic rivalries a fusion of their essential interests; to estab-
lish, by creating an economic community, the foundation of a broad and inde-
pendent community among peoples long divided by bloody conflicts; and to
lay the bases of institutions capable of giving direction to their future common
destiny.
25
The importance of creating a common European market and preventing
the re-segmentation of the market, led the Commission and the European
Court of Justice ("ECJ") to a strict application of Article 8 1(1) toward ver-
tical restraints, specifically non-price vertical restraints.26 Community law
has always been very suspicious of attempts to segment and re-partition the
markets. Thus, companies had to pay particular attention to the structure of
their distribution networks inside the Member States of the EC.
The analysis of whether an agreement infringes Article 81 takes place
in two stages. The first inquiry is whether it falls within the scope of Arti-
cle 81. A vertical agreement will only fall within the scope of Article 81(1)
when all of the elements are fulfilled.27 Restraints that fall within the scope
of Article 81(1) are found null and void according to Art. 81(2).21 Whether
the underlying contract will become invalid in its entirety depends on the
23 Council Regulation 17/62, 1959-1962 O.J. SPEC. ED. 87, amended by Council Regula-
tion 59/62, 1962 J.O. (1655), Council Regulation 118/63, 1963 J.O. (2696), and Council
Regulation 2822/71, 1971 O.J. (L 285) 49. For further discussion, see Arved Deringer The
Distribution ofPower in the Enforcement of the Rules of Competition under the Rome Treaty
1 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 30 (1963).
24 See Ulrich Everling Zur Wettbewerbskonzeption in der neueren Rechtsprechung des
Gerichtshofs der Europdiischen Gemeinschaften, 40 WiRTSCHAFT UND WErTnEWERB 995,
1000 (1990).
25 See TREATY INsTITUTING THE EUROPEAN COAL AND STEEL COMMUNrrY, April 18, 195 1,
261 U.N.T.S. 142, 143. [hereinafter COAL & STEEL TREATY].
26 See Donncadh Woods and Mario Filipponi, Vertical Agreements, in THE EC LAW OF
COMPETITION 431, 432 (Jonathan Faull & Ali Nikpay eds., 1999). See generally Case 32/65,
Government of the Italian Republic v. Council of the EEC and Commission of the EEC,
1966 E.C.R. 389 (discussing application of Article 85, which is now Article 81). Vertical
agreements in the area of coal and steel are treated under Art. 65, § 1 of The Treaty Estab-
lishing the European Coal and Steel Community. See COAL & STEEL TREATY, supra note
25, at 195.
27 For an analysis of the different elements of Article 81(1) in a vertical context, see
Donncadh Woods and Mario Filipponi, Vertical Agreements, in THE EC LAW OF
COMPETION supra note 26, at 432-438.
28 This is the main difference between Art. 81 and the antitrust laws in the U.S., Canada
and the Member States with older competition laws like, Germany. In these jurisdictions
vertical agreement remains valid until a decision by the respective antitrust authority.
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respective national law of the member state.29 The Commission can, ac-
cording to Art. 15(2) of Regulation No. 17, impose fines30 on companies
that participated in infringement. A recent well-known example is the
Volkswagen 3ase.
Restraints found null and void under Article 8 1(1) and therefore unen-
forceable can be exempted from this remedy through a second examination
following Article 81(3). This second analysis is according to Article 9(1) of
Regulation No. 17 at the discretion of the Commission. This exempti'
provision is a device to consider the procompetitive aspects of an agreeme
condemned under a literal reading of Article 81(3). The agreement must
not eliminate competition, and the efficiency gains or other objective ad-
vantages it promotes must outweigh the disadvantages from the loss of
competition. Furthermore, the provision takes other Community goals,
such as the health and safety of the consumer, as well as other social con-
cerns, into consideration when determining whether a particular restraint
should be authorized.32 An exemption can be made either witlin the scope
of an individual case decision following a formal notification of the agree-
ment with the Commission or by means of an abstract-general block ex-
emption regulation, which expresses an exemption for the agreements that
fulfill the elements of the regulation.
A. U.S. Law on Vertical Agreements
A detailed comparison of the EC and the U.S. law toward vertical
agreements is beyond the scope of this article. Nevertheless, it is useful to
delineate the following basic ideas and the subsequent different approaches
underlying the two systems.
The Community and the United States have different approaches in
their laws on vertical restraints. The EC competition rules governing verti-
cal agreements are more regulatory than the U.S. law in this area. The latter
permits greater freedom of action for the enterprises, e.g., in assigning ter-
ritories to dealers and restricting transshipments.33 This gap still exists after
29 For the law in Germany, see GERMAN CIVL CODE art. 139, translated by Simon L.
Goren (1994) (F.R.G.).30 From 1,000 to 1,000,000 Euro, or a sum in excess thereof but not exceeding 10 % of
the turnover in the preceding business year. See Council Regulation 17 of 21 February 1962
First Regulation Implementing Article 85 and 86 of the Treaty, art. 15(2), 1959-1962 O.J.
SPEC. ED. 91.
31 See generally Commission Decision of 28 January 1998 Relating to a Proceeding Un-
der Article 85 of the EC Treaty (Case IV/35.733 - VW), 1998 O.J. (L124) 60 (discussing the
Volkswagen case). The Commission imposed a fine of ECU 102 million on Volkswagen.
See id.
32 See Green Paper, supra note 7, at iv., Exec. Summary.
33 See Spencer Weber Waller Understanding and Appreciating EC Competition Law, 61
ANTTRUST L.J. 55, 68 (1992); Shanker A. Singham, Shaping Competition Policy in the
Americas: Scope for Transatlantic Cooperation?, 24 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 363,401 (1998).
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the completion of the present reform, but it has narrowed significantly.
34
American antitrust law has existed for more than a century and is assumed
to have had a pervasive impact on the American economy 5 In the past
thirty years, the principles governing vertical arrangements in the United
States have undergone extraordinary adjustment.36 The 1960s was an era in
which the Supreme Court expanded prohibitions against resale price main-
tenance ("RPM")37 and tying arrangements 38 and imposed draconian limits
on vertical territorial restrictions, exclusive dealing arrangements,39 and
other distribution strategies. The pre-reform European analysis of these
agreements can therefore be described as an analysis similar to the 1960s
era of antitrust analysis in the U.S.
40
34 See Carlin, supra note 7, at 287.35 See Per Jebsen and Robert Stevens, Assumptions, Goals and Dominant Undertakings:
The Regulation of Competition Under Article 86 of the European Union, 64 ANTITRUST L.J.
443,454 (1996).
36 See Murray S. Monroe, Vertical Restraints, 27 U. TOL. L. Ray. 433, 460 (1996); War-
ren S. Grimes, Brand Marketing, Intrabrand Competition, and the Multibrand Retailer: The
Antitrust Law of Vertical Restraints, 64 ANTITRusT L.J. 83, 84-85; see also White Motor Co.
v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963) (declining to set a standard governing nonprice verti-
cal restraints); United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967) (adopting a per
se rule); Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977) (discarding the per
se rule and returning to a rule of reason).
37 See Richard M. Steuer, Vertical Restraints in the Nineties, 62 ANTrrRuST L.J. 717, 718
(1994). In most circumstances, maximum RPM does not pose the risks of anticompetitive
effects that may be present in minimum RPM. See Comments of the Section ofAntitrust Law
and the Section of International Law and Practice of the American Bar Association on the
European Commission's Green Paper on Vertical Restraints in EC Competition Policy,
available at http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/ecvert.html (on file with author). RPM is de-
fined as "agreements between a supplier and a buyer under which the buyer agrees to resell
the supplier's product at a given price or at a specified price level." See Business Elecs.
Corp. v. Sharp Elecs., 485 U.S. 717, 731 (1988); see also Michael L. Denger, Resale Pricing
Issues in Distribution and Franchisor Operations, 60 ANTIruST L.J. 419, 419 (1991).38 A tying agreement is one in which a supplier conditions the sale of one product or
service (the "tying product") on the purchase of a separate product or service (the "tied
product"), or upon the agreement that the tied product will not be bought from another sup-
plier. See Monroe, supra note 36, at 439.39 In the case of "exclusive dealing," the distributor agrees not to buy any competing
product from any other supplier. The restriction is based on the distributor. It forecloses
competing suppliers from selling to the distributor and simply precludes the distributor from
buying a competing product. See Vertical Restrictions Upon Buyers Limiting Purchase of
Goods From Others, 8 A.B.A. ANTrrRUST SEC. 84, 90 (1982). In the area of exclusive deal-
ing, the European Commission and the Courts take this danger of foreclosure very seriously
as an analytical tool. In particular, exclusive dealing arrangements are more likely to be
prohibited where the industry is characterized by such agreements and the cumulative fore-
closure is significant. See Case 23/67, Brasserie de Haecht v. Wilkin and Wilkin, 1967
E.C.R. 407,415.
40 See Steven P. Reynolds, International Antitrust Compliance for a Company with Mul-
tinational Operations, 8 INT'L Q. 76 (1996).
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Until the U.S. Supreme Court's 1977 Sylvania decision, antitrust
judgments often ignored potential pro-competitive effects of vertical
agreements and presumed that vertical contractual restraints had sinister
aims. The Court often evaluated vertical restraints by applying rules that
governed similar conduct in a horizontal context. In Sylvania, the Supreme
Court stated for the first time that vertical restrictions "are widely used in
our free market economy, [that] there is substantial scholarly and judicial
authority supporting their economic utility, [and that any departure from the
rule of reason standard] must be based upon demonstrable economic effect
rather than as in Schwinn upon formalistic line drawing."' 1 After Sylvania,
the U.S. courts and the antitrust authorities recognized that vertical re-
straints may lead to real efficiencies, for example, by eliminating the free-
rider problem.42 The Court began focusing on the real impact an agreement
has on competition by examining the extent of market power to assess
whether there is genuine anti-competitive effect.
Like sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act,43 Articles 81 and 82 of the
Treaty are phrased in broad language with the burden on the judiciary to fill
in the details in creating a comprehensive legal regime. In the EC, the ECJ
and later, the Court of First Instance, have played a critical role by extend-
ing the scope of the Treaty provisions to cover vertical restraints, mergers,
and a variety of predatory and exclusionary practices. 4 While Article 81
has certain parallels with Section 1 of the Sherman Act, its very language
prohibits concerted practices beyond the reach of even the most expansive
interpretation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.
45
Competition law in the EC developed for very different reasons than
did antitrust law in the United States.46 The evolution of U.S. antitrust law
4t Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 , 57-59 (1977). In Sylvania
the rule of reason test was adopted for all vertical restraints other than vertical price-fixing.
In Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp., the Court extended this rationale
to conduct that had the same economic impact as price-fixing. 485 U.S. 717 (1988).
42 Cf. Jebsen and Stevens, supra note 35, at 446. EC competition law on its face does not
follow the economic model of competition as a generator of efficiency. Some scholars point
out, however, that the approach of the European Competition Law as actually interpreted by
the Commission, the European Courts and national courts, is noticeably more market-
oriented than the legislation itself.
43 Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (2000).
44 See Spencer Weber Waller, EEC Competition Law: Business Issues & Legal Principles
in Common Market Antitrust Cases, 5 Nw. J. Int'l. L. & Bus. 951 (1983) (book review).45See id. at 952, comparing AFC Chemifarma v. Commission, 1970 E.C.R. 661, with
Theatre Enters., Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537 (1954).
"6 See Robert T. Jones, American Antitrust and EEC Competition Law in Comparative
Perspective, 90 LAW Q. REV., 191, 198-199 (1974); Gabriele Dara, Antitrust Law in the
European Community and the United States: A Comparative Analysis, 47 LA. L. REV. 761,
764 (1987). "Apart from the Monopolies and Restrictive Practices (Inquiry and Control) Act
of 1948, passed in the United Kingdom, and the West German Gesetz gegen Wettbew-
erbsbeschrdnkungen of 7.27.1957, none of the other European countries developed any sub-
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has arisen out of a deep-rooted distrust of political and economic power.4 7
Subsequently, in order to combat this distrust, efficiency became a vital
thing to consider in the administration of U.S. antitrust laws.48 The creation
of the European competition law can be traced back to two chains of rea-
soning. The first fundamental reason for its creation was that a common
competition law would lead to a greater unity among the Member States, a
moral imperative after the bloody conflicts of the past.49 An economic im-
perative provided the second reason. The enterprises of the Member States
of the European Economic Community ("EEC"), in a very weak state after
the Sec6nd World War, needed to improve their position in order to be bet-
ter able to compete with their competitors outside the Community, espe-
cially in the United States.50
Following these different motivations for their existence, the most fun-
damental difference between the two systems lies in the overriding purpose
of the various competition laws.51 The antitrust laws of the Untied States
are based on a notion that competition is valuable for its own sake.52 While
the origins of U.S. antitrust law are in many ways connected to an economic
philosophy favoring competition, this is not the primary goal of the EC
Treaty. The Treaty recognizes this aim, but only as a subsidiary goal to the
stantial legislation prior to the establishment of the EEC." Id. at 762; see also Waller, supra
note 33, at 55 (emphasizing the importance of that fundamental difference for the interpreta-
tion of the two systems).
47 See Eleanor Fox, Antitrust, Trade and the Twenty-First Century - Rounding the Circle,
48 REc., N.Y. Cny B. ASS'N 535, 539 (1993).
4 8 See Singham, supra note 33, at 349; Eleanor Fox, Monopolization and Dominance in
the United States and the European Community: Efficiency, Opportunity, and Fairness, 61
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 981, 983 (1986) (suggesting that courts in the U.S. generally apply
antitrust laws only in ways that do not harm economic efficiency); Emmanuel P. Mastroma-
nolis, Insights from U.S. Antitrust Law on Exclusive and Restricted Territorial Distribution:
The Creation of a New Legal Standard for European Union Competition Law, 15 U. PA. J.
INT'L BUS. L. 559 (1995). "Efficiency is hence a purely economic principle necessitating
the allocation of all available market resources in the best possible way, ultimately leading to
an increase in market output." Id. at 561.49 After the rejection of attempts to move towards political solutions and the plans for a
European Defense Community had been defeated largely by the French government, the
only way left to build a new Europe was therefore on economic cooperation and integration.
See RICHARD MAYNE, THE RECOVERY OF EUROPE: 1945-1973, 235-304 (1973).
5 0 See David J. Gerber, The Transformation of European Community Competition Law,
35 HARV. INT'L L. J. 97, 102 (1994).
51 See Dara, supra note 46, at 764; Mastromanolis, supra note 48, at 561. Another major
difference between EC and U.S. antitrust systems lies in the role of private enforcement and
the activities in enforcing the law and implementing competition policy. See Jonathan Faull,
The Enforcement of Competition Policy in the European Community: A Mature System, 15
FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 219, 222 (1992); Singham, supra note 33, at 389.
52 See N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958); see also Waller, supra note
44, at 952 n.8. (referring to the debate in the U.S. whether to define competition in eco-
nomic, social or political terms).
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achievement of an integrated European common market.53 The twin goals
set out by the Treaty for its antitrust regulations are economic integration
within the EC and the creation of a common market, while avoiding "a
weakening of competition [which] would be contrary to the goals of the
common market."5  Articles 81 and 82 are functional instruments of this
raison d'etre of economic integration making companies and consumers
comfortable with the idea that they are living and working in a common
market. Practices considered illegal under these provisions are prohibited
as incompatible with the common market.5 5 This is a role that the provi-
sions of the Sherman Act do not need to play. The different dominating
function of the European competition law of creating a common market is
illustrated by two crucial distinctions of the two systems: first, the hostility
to any form of territorial protection or export prohibition and second, the
existence of Article 81(3).
B. Introduction to Vertical Agreements
The concept of vertical restraints encompasses arrangements between
companies at different levels of the manufacturing or distribution chain that
restrict the conditions under which enterprises may acquire, sell or resell
certain goods or services. Article 2(1) of the new Commission Regulation
(EC) No 2790/1999 defines vertical agreements as:
Agreements or concerted practices entered into between two or more under-
takings each of which operates, for the purposes of the agreement, at a differ-
ent level of the production or distribution chain, and relating to the conditions
under which the parties may purchase, see or resell certain goods or services.5
6
On one hand, these arrangements can be introduced in a positive way
for competition to facilitate the entry of enterprises into new markets. By
permitting manufacturers to have more influence over the way their brands
are marketed, vertical agreements help them to be more successful and thus
53 Article 2 of the Treaty states:
The Community shall have as its task, by establishing a common market and progres-
sively approximating the economic policies of Member States, to promote throughout
the Community a harmonious development of economic activities, a continuos and
balanced expansion, an increase in stability, an accelerated raising of the standard of
living and closer relations between the States belonging to it.
EC TREATY, supra note 2, art. 81(2).
54 Case 6/72, Europemballage Corp. v. Commission, 1973 E.C.R. 215, 244, [1973] 12
C.M.L.R. 199, 224 (1973); see also Gerber, supra note 50, at 101-102 (explaining the goals
of European Competition Law).
ssSee EC TREATY, supra note 2, art. 8 1(1).
6 See Commission Regulation, supra note 3, at 23; see also Guidelines, supra note 5, at 5
for more detailed comments on the three main elements in this definition. A vertical re-
straint should be contrasted with a horizontal restraint, which is a restraint imposed by an
agreement between two or more competitors. See Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Electronics
Corp., 485 U.S. 717,730 (1988).
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promote competition. On the other hand, arrangements between producers
and distributors can also be used to re-partition the common market or ex-
clude new entrants who would intensify competition, thus foreclosing mar-
kets and bring about downward pressure on prices. 7 The desire to prevent
the territorial division of different national markets in the Community and
to achieve a common market means that the European Union is unsympa-
thetic to the U.S. position articulated by the Supreme Court in Sylvania,
5
that in the absence of market power on the supply side, nonprice vertical re-
straints are unobjectionable. 9
1. The Economics of Vertical Agreements
Economists have intensively discussed the economic analysis of verti-
cal agreements in the past decades. ° The economic thinking behind the
previous tough approach to vertical restraints in the EC was to tackle exclu-
sively the anticompetitive character of these agreements. In the present re-
form this strict approach has now been relaxed by the Commission due to
the belief that the economic consensus in the EC is now more balanced to-
ward such agreements.6' A further economic consensus exists that vertical
restraints are, on average, less harmful than horizontal competition re-
straints.
62
In the area of vertical agreements competition concerns can only arise
if there exists a certain degree of market power because of insufficient in-
terbrand competition.63 The stronger this interbrand competition is the
more likely it is that vertical agreements do not have a negative effect. De-
pending on the specific market structure, the identical vertical restraint can
therefore have a different effect. The introduction of the market share test
is the implementation of this more economic based approach. If a party to
an agreement has a market share above the threshold, a case-by-case ap-
proach is warranted for the vertical agreement in order to analyze the po-
tential positive and negative effects.
57 See Eleanor Fox, Toward World Antitrust and Market Access, 91 A. J. INT'L L. 1, 7
(1997) (questioning whether a firm, acting alone, can isolate and re-partition national mar-
kets).
58 Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
59 For examples of how the European Court of Justice values the danger of foreclosure,
see Case T-7/93, Langnese-Iglo GmbH v. Commission, 1995 E.C.R. II - 1533 and Case T-
9/93, Sch6ller Lebensmittel GmbH v. Commission, 1995 E.C.R. 11-1611.
60 See F. M. Scherer, The Economics of Vertical Restraints, 52 ANTITRUST L. J. 687
(1983) (discussing an overview of the developments).61 See Luc Peeperkom The Economies of Verticals, COMPETITION POL'Y NEWSL.
(Competition Dir. Gen., Brussels, Belg.), June 1998, at http://europa.eu.int/comm/competiti
on/speeches/text/sp_1998 020 en.html (last visited Oct. 29, 2000).62 See id.
63See id.
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These agreements are very important for the functioning of the econ-
omy. They may contain certain restrictions that, absent significant market
power, can have neutral or even positive effects. The first and major possi-
ble effect is the avoidance of the free-rider problem; a second possible ef-
fect is the improvement of production and distribution." However, such
agreements can also have negative effects on the market. Potential negative
effects include foreclosure, the deterioration of price and non-price condi-
tions, collusion among the distribution chain and, in the Community con-
text, the creation of obstacles to market integration.65 Due to this
ambiguous nature, vertical agreements can be used pro-competitively to
promote market integration and efficient distribution or anti-competitively
to block integration and competition.
C. Former EC Rules on Vertical Agreements
Because of concerns over the threats vertical restraints pose to market
integration, the previous Commission policy has applied Article 81(1) rela-
tively strictly.66 The Commission decided that both intra-brand67 and inter-
brand68 competition were of equal concern for the strategy of European
competition policy toward the single market.69 Vertical restraints of intra-
brand competition, such as grants of exclusive territories by means of ab-
solute territorial protection ("ATP') 7 ° and exclusion of parallel im-
ports/exports, generally triggered the application of Article 81 (1), regardless
of their overall effect on interbrand competition or efficiency.
6See id.; Warren S. Grimes, Brand Marketing, Intrabrand Competition, and the Multi-
brand Retailer: The Antitrust Law of Vertical Restraints, 64 ANTITRUST L. J. 83, 89-97
(1995).
65 See Peeperkom, supra note 61.
66 See Carlin, supra note 7, at 283.
67 The competition between sellers of one brand.
68 The competition between different brands.
69 See Carlin, supra note 7, at 284 (discussing the significance of intra-brand competi-
tion). In the U.S. since Sylvania interbrand competition is deemed more significant than in-
trabrand competition. See Grimes, supra note 64.
70 Absolute territorial protection ("ATP") of a distributor exists, for example, where, there
is no other source of supply for a customer within the territory other than the exclusive dis-
tributor. While a distributor may be allocated an exclusive territory in order to better pene-
trate the market and make distribution more efficient and may be forbidden to sell or
promote directly in the territory of other exclusive distributors, this protection must not be
absolute. Cf. Green Paper, supra note 7, at 8. To guard against this, the Commission insists
on allowing distributors outside the territory to respond to orders from customers in the ter-
ritory, so-called "passive sales" or, where a distributor is appointed for the whole of the EU,
normally the supplier must be free to respond to orders from customers in the territory.
71 See Joined Cases 56 & 58/64, Etablissements Consten, S.A.R.L. v. Commission, 1966
E.C.R. 299, 342, [1966] 5 C.M.L.L 418, 475 (1966); Robert L. Steiner, Intrabrand Compe-
tition - Stepchild ofAntitrust, 36 ANTITRUST BULL. 155 (1991); see also Robert L. Steiner,
How Manufacturers Deal with the Price-Cutting Retailer: When Are Vertical Restraints
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Agreements of minor importance did and still do not fall under Art.
81(1) according to the "de minimis" notice.72 According to this notice, ver-
tical agreements are not covered by Art. 81(1) if the aggregate market
shares held by all of the participating undertakings do not exceed 10
percent73 or if the participating companies are small and medium sized un-
dertakings. 74 However, this notice does not apply where competition is re-
stricted by agreements involving territorial protection and by the cumulative
effects of parallel networks of similar agreements established by several
manufacturers or dealers.7
If these explicit exceptions from the application of Article 81(1) did
not apply, a notification and a subsequent case-by-case analysis of the re-
spective vertical agreement were necessary to determine the application of
Article 81 .76 Even if the individual agreement did not fall within the scope
of Article 81(1), the cumulative impact of several similar agreements may
have appreciably restricted competition.77 The analysis allowed exemptions
to the rule if, broadly speaking, agreements contributed to the improvement
of production and distribution and also benefited the consumer. To reduce
the burden of having to deal with large volumes of standard notifications
due to the wide application of Article 8 1(1) to vertical agreements, the
Commission had adopted block exemption regulations covering the catego-
ries of agreements mentioned above. 78  Agreements falling under these
Regulations, although restrictive of competition, are deemed to fulfill the
requirements for exemption under Article 81(3).
Efficient? 65 ANTITRUST L. J. 407 (1997) (regarding the economic importance of intra-
brand competition); Donncadh Woods and Mario Filipponi, Vertical Agreements, in THE EC
LAw OF COMPETITION, supra note 26, at 445-448.
72 See Notice on Agreements of Minor Importance Which Do Not Fall Within the Mean-
ing of Article 85(1) of the Treaty Establishing the European Community, 1997 O.J. (C 372)
13. In the field of vertical agreements, subject to the conditions set out in the de minimis
notice concerning hardcore restrictions and cumulative effect issues, agreements entered into
by undertakings whose market share on the relevant market does not exceed 10 per cent are
generally considered to fall outside the scope of application of Article 81(1). See Donncadh
Woods and Mario Filipponi, Vertical Agreements, in THE EC LAW OF COMPETITION, supra
note 26, at 445 (regarding the vertical aspects of the de minimis concept).
73 See Notice on Agreements of Minor Importance, supra note 72, at 14.
74 See Commission Recommendation of 3 April 1996 Concerning the Definition of Small
and Medium-Sized Enterprises, 1996 O.J. (L107) 4, 8.
75 See Notice on Agreements of Minor Importance, supra note 72, at 15. Since these
types of restraints are typical for vertical agreements, this Notice was often not applicable in
cases of vertical agreements. See Semler and Bauer, supra note 10, at 193.
76 See Waller, supra note 33, at 66. The U.S. antitrust law does not have a notification
system with respect to restrictive agreements; see also Green Paper, supra note 7, para. 212.
77 See Donncadh Woods and Mario Filipponi, Vertical Agreements, in THE EC LAW OF
COMPETITION, supra note 71, at 467, for the assessment required to find a cumulative effect
which falls within the scope of Article 81(1).
78 See Waller, supra note 33, for an overview of the block exemption regulations.
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1. Criticism of the Previous Competition Rules on Vertical Restraints
During the reform process of its policy, the Commission, aided by con-
sultation with industry and legal experts, identified several key criticisms of
the previous system.79 A major complaint concerned the inflexible, over-
regulated and therefore costly nature of the previous vertical restraint re-
gime introduced by the EEC nearly 40 years ago.80 Businesses were
burdened with the pressure to write agreements that fit the rigid categories
of the exemptions and this exercise encompassed both a good deal of time
and a considerable amount of money in attorneys' fees. In summary, criti-
cism of the previous block exemption regulations described them as being
too legalistic, prescriptive and limited in scope.8'
The practice of five different block exemption regulations in the area
of vertical agreement contributed to the problem because they were nar-
rowly defined and because their static character was not suited to corpora-
tions' needs for flexible contract formulation.82 The objective of creating
vital legal certainty for the enterprises concerned with this policy caused the
so-called "strait-jacket-effect ' 83 of the block exemption regulations, which
was a structural flaw inherent in any system that attempts to identify that
clauses are exempt." This system of individual block exemption regula-
tions also included the consequence that a number of vertical agreements,
such as those in the service sector,85 were not covered by any block exemp-
tion regulation. Therefore, under the old regime these companies had to
notify the Commission of their agreements in economically important cases
in order to be on the safe side.
Other critics based their call for reforms on the overload of notifica-
tions that are received by the Commission.86 In order to ensure the uniform
79 See Green Paper, supra note 7, at 2; see also Hermann H. Kallfass, Vertikale Vertrage
in der Wettbewerbspolitik der EU, 49 WIRTSCHAFT UND WETrBEWERB 225, 236 (1999).80 The European Economic Community, now officially entitled the "European Commu-
nity", is a constituent part of the European Union, which was established by the TREATY ON
EUROPEAN UNION, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. (C 191) 1 (1992), 31 I.L.M. 247 (1992).
81 See Green Paper, supra note 7, at 2.
82 The block exemption instrument has been invaluable in dealing with areas which were
once controversial and gave rise to hundreds, sometimes thousands, of notifications. See
Faull, supra note 51, at 226.
83 See Commission Communication, supra note 12, at 3. The "straight-jacket-effect" de-
scribes the constraints imposed on entities during the drafting process of vertical agreements
under the old regime.
84 See Commission Report (XXVIII) on Competition Policy, SEC(99)743 final at 21,
available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/annualreports/1998/en/OO1_130.pdf.
85 See Commission Regulation 1983/83, 1983 O.J. (L 173) 1; Commission Regulation
1984/83, 1983 O.J. (L 173) 5 (block exemption regulations did not apply to these agree-
ments).
96 For details, see Laraine L. Laudati, The First European Competition Forum: Vertical
Restraints, COMPETITION POL'Y NEWSL. (Competition Dir. Gen., Brussels, BeIg.), Summer
1995, at 2, at http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/speeches/text/sp1995_035_en.html.
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application of the competition rules within the common market from the
outset, extensive powers necessary for their implementation have been
combined and assigned to the Commission.17 The Commission receives
many notifications of agreements that do not give rise to any serious com-
petition problem.8 This results in many unclosed files, time consuming
procedures and a general legal uncertainty during this period of time, even
in cases of insignificant agreements. The Commission takes up to two or
three years to respond to a notification with a formal decision.89 The Com-
petition DG only had the limited capacity to formally decide about 20 noti-
fications by formal decision and to issue about 150 comfort letters per
year. 90 In a comfort letter, the Competition DG writes to say that it is satis-
fied on the basis of the information available to it that a vertical agreement
does not fall within Article 81(1) or that it does but merits exemption under
Article 81(3).91 The Competition DG then states that it does not intend to
recommend to the Commission that it should make a formal decision, but
instead should close its file in the case. The file, however, may be reopened
in the event of a complaint or a material change of law or fact.92
Commentators question whether comfort letters provide a satisfactory solu-
tion.9 3 In order to maintain at least minimal legal security, the undertakings
87 See Commission Regulation 17/62, art. 9, 1959-1962 O.J. SPEC. ED. 87.
88 See Helmut Schr6ter, Zur Beurteilung vertikaler Wettbewerbsbeschriinkungen nach
Artikel 85 des EG-Vertrages, at http://europa.eu.intcommdgO4/speech/six/desp96047.htm
(last visited Oct. 31, 2000).
89 See Frank Montag, The Case for a Reform of Regulation 17/62: Problems and Possible
Solutions.from a Practitioner's Point of View, 22 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 819, 827 (1999) (re-
ferring to "cases where parties notified agreements as long as fifteen years ago without ever
receiving a clearance decision to date.")
90 See Hermann H. Kallfass, Vertikale Vertriige in der Wettbewerbspolitik der EU,
WITSCHAFT UND WETTBEWERB 225, 235 (1999).
91 In a discomfort letter, the Competition DG writes to say that an agreement falls within
Article 81(1) and does not, in its view, merit exemption. It may therefore, in whole or in
part, be null and void pursuant to Article 81(2). However, the Competition DG does not
propose to recommend that the Commission take a decision in the case, and it closes the file
on the same terms as for a comfort letter. A discomfort letter will frequently be used when a
national court is better placed than the Commission to resolve a dispute. See Faull, supra
note 51, at 233. Discomfort letters and block exemption regulations were a response to the
Commission's inability to supply negative clearance or exemption decisions to meet the de-
mand by notifiers of agreements. See id. at 226. Currently no more than around twenty
formal decisions a year are adopted See Commission Report (XXVI) on Competition Policy,
SEC(98)636 final at 38-40, available at http://europa.eu.int/comnm/competition/annualr
eports/rap97/en.html [hereinafter Commission, XXVIIth Report]. In 1997, 27 formal deci-
sions were made. See id. Similarly, 21 formal decisions were made in 1996, while 209 noti-
fications were received pursuant to Article 81. See Commission Report (XXVI) on
Competition Policy, SEC(97)628 final at 50, available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/competi
tion/annual-reports/rap96_en.html.
92 See Faull, supra note 51, at 223.
93 See Tara Bums Newell, Comment, The Removal of Vertical Restraints in EC Competi-
tion Policy, 4 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 191, 193 (1998); Singham, supra note 33, at 389; Montag,
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were forced against their own belief to follow the white list approach,
94
which led to the strait-jacket-effect of the previous systems of block ex-
emption regulations.
Critics have been consistent in urging that a market analysis should be
the initial step in analyzing vertical restraints in order to determine whether
a restriction of competition exists under Article 81(1). 95 Previously, too
much emphasis had been put on analysis of individual clauses within an
agreement at the expense of considering the economic impact of the agree-
ment as a whole.96 Enterprises view the possibility of "one-stop-shopping"
with one agency as valuable. Legal security, feared to be lost under the new
market share threshold approach, is also viewed as valuable.97
Ill. THE NEW COMPETITION REGULATION ON VERTICAL AGREEMENTS
A. Reform Process
The Commission began the extensive reform process under two prem-
ises: first, that Article 81 remains applicable to vertical agreements and sec-
ond, that no policy reform which goes beyond the bounds of Article 81 as
interpreted by the Community Courts should be contemplated. 98 The im-
plementation of the policy proposal required three new legislative texts,
namely, the amendment of two Council Regulations and a Commission
block exemption regulation covering all vertical restraints in almost all
sectors of distribution. Additionally, accompanying guidelines were intro-
duced. The first amended Council Regulation was Regulation No. 17.99
The second was Council Regulation No. 19/65/EEC of March 2, 1965 on
the Application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to Certain Categories of
Agreements and Concerted Practices,1°° as last amended by Council Regu-
lation (EC) No. 1215/1999 of June 10, 1999.'0'
supra note 89, at 826-827; Mario Siragusa, The Millenium Approaches: Rethinking. Article
85 and the Problems Challenges in the Design and Enforcement of the EC Competition
Rules, 21 FORDHAM INT'L L.J., 650, 662-663 (1998).
94 A "white list" is an exhaustive catalogue of the restrictive clauses that are exempted
under the regulation.
95 See Laudati, supra note 86, at 2.
96 See Lucas Peeperkom, Commission Adopts Green Paper on Vertical Restraints in EU
Competition Policy, at http://europa.eu.int/comnm/competition/speeches/text/sp1997_002_e
n.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2000).
97 See id.
98 A "[t]reaty amendment is not an option." Green Paper, supra note 7, at 2.
" See Council Regulation 17/62, 1962 O.J. (204), 1959-62 O.J. SPEC. ED. 87.
10o Council Regulation 19/65, 1965-1966 O.3. SPEc. ED. 36, 533.
10' See Council Regulation 1215/1999 O.J. (L 148) 1.
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1. Amendment of Council Regulation 17/62/EEC
In the form of Regulation No. 17, the Council adopted the first Regu-
lation concerning the implementation of Articles 81 and 82, according to
Article 83(1), subparagraph 1.102 The intention behind this Regulation was
to give effect to the principles set out in Articles 81 and 82 by giving the
Commission the exclusive competence to grant exemptions under Article
81(3) but also by setting up a system of notification to the Commission for
agreements for which an exemption or negative clearance is sought. The
regulation states that undertakings are obliged to submit a notification prior
to the date of exemption in order to be exempted from the application of the
provisions of these Articles. Such a notification ensures a protection from
fines and, in the event that an individual exemption is granted, guarantees
the enforceability of the agreement and constitutes a bar to private actions
for damages.
The amendment to this Regulation broadens the scope of the applica-
tion of Article 4(2) of Regulation No. 17, which exempts all vertical agree-
ments from the requirement that they be notified prior to individual
exemption. 10 3 The practical goal the Commission pursued with this
amendment is that, even in the event of late notification, it will consider
whether the agreement in question satisfies the conditions of Article 81(3)
and, if so, it will adopt an exemption decision taking effect on the date on
which the agreement was entered into.1" According to the Commission,
this scope for retroactive exemption gives enterprises greater legal certainty
by ensuring that agreements satisfying the exemption conditions laid down
in Article 81(3) can be implemented. 05 In this way, the legal security af-
forded to firms would be strengthened without jeopardizing the enforce-
ment of Article 81(1) with regard to anticompetitive agreements. 10 6 The
Commission further hopes to reduce the number of notifications by enter-
prises, which are only filed as a precaution to block subsequent antitrust
objections.
10 7
102 Regulation No. 17 has remained unchanged in substance since the 1960s. See Faull,
supra note 51, at 222. For different proposals for reforming the present enforcement proce-
dure of EC competition law under Regulation No. 17, see Montag, supra note 89, at 829-
847.
103 See Press Release IP99/286, European Commission, Council Gives Green Light for
Reform of the EU Competition Rules Applicable to Vertical Restraints (May 7, 1999), at
http://europa.eu.int/en/comm/competition/index-en.html.104 See Montag, supra note 89, at 837.
105 See Bureau of National Affairs, 76 ANTITRUST AND TRADE REGULATION REPORT OF
MAY 6, 1999 484 (1999).
1
0 6 See Commission Report, supra note 84, at 23.
107 See Council Regulation 1216/1999,1999 O.J. (L 148) 5.
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2. Amendment of Council Regulation 19/65/EEC
On June 10, 1999, the Council adopted Council Regulation (EC) No.
1215/1999, amending Regulation No 19/65/EEC on the application of Arti-
cle 81(3) of the Treaty to Certain Categories of Agreements and Concerted
Practices.0 8 With Regulation No. 19/65/EEC, the Council empowered the
Commission in accordance with Article 81(3) of the Treaty to adopt regula-
tions declaring that Article 81(1) does not apply to certain categories of
agreements. The compliance of the Block Exemption Regulation with the
agreement in question confers automatic exemption under Article 81(3)
from the prohibition of Article 81(1).1° 9 It thus defines the non-application
of Article 81(1) to certain types of agreements that generally fulfill the con-
ditions of Article 81(3) and are, therefore, exempted. This Regulation re-
quires that the Commission block exemption regulations contain lists of
conditions that must be fulfilled, the types of agreements covered, restric-
tive clauses that are exempted and clauses that must not be included.
Council Regulation No. 19/65/EEC was restricted to a limited number
of vertical restraints, namely, the exclusive distribution of goods for resale,
the exclusive purchase for resale, and the restrictions imposed in relation to
the assignment or use of industrial property rights. It was also limited to
agreements entered into between two parties. The Commission block ex-
emption regulations in the field of distribution, which were adopted pursu-
ant to Council Regulation No. 19/65/EEC, covered only the areas of
exclusive distribution (where a producer agrees to appoint only one dis-
tributor in a specific territory),n1 exclusive purchasing (whereby a dis-
tributor agrees only to take supplies from a single producer, including
special provisions for beer and petrol),"' franchising (whereby a franchisee
is allocated an exclusive territory in which to exploit the know-how and in-
tellectual property rights of the franchiser and agrees to sell the products in
a standardized format),' 12 and motor vehicle distribution and servicing
log See Council Regulation 1215/1999, 1999 O.J. (L 148) 1.
109 For the requirements of Council Regulation 19/65, see Donncadh Woods and Mario
Filipponi, Vertical.greements, in THE EC LAW OF COMPETITION, supra note 26, at 436.
11 See Commission Regulation 1983/83, 1983 O.J. (L 173) 1, amended by Commission
Regulation 1582/97, 1997 Q.J. (L 214) 27. This form of distribution enables the supplier to
concentrate his sale activities without having to contract with numerous small dealers, in re-
turn for limited or absolute exclusivity, the distributor can be required to focus his sale ef-
forts within the territory and refrain from manufacturing or distributing competing products.
11 See Commission Regulation 1984/83, 1983 O.L (L 173) 5, amended by Commission
Regulation 1582/97, 1997 O.J. (L 214) 27. Exclusive purchasing agreements enable the
supplier better to plan his sales over a longer period and increase security of supply for the
reseller.
1 2 See Commission Regulation 4087/88, 1988 O.L (L 359) 46, amended by Commission
Regulation 1582/97, 1997 O.J. (L 214) 27; see also Christoph Liebscher and Alexander
Petsche, Franchising nach der neuen Gruppenfreistellungsverordnung (EG) Nr. 2790/99ftir
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agreements.1 3 No block exemption regulation has been adopted for selec-
tive distribution.
1 14
The amendment of this Council Regulation by the Council on April 29,
1999 extended the Commission's legislative powers, allowing it to adopt
the new Commission Regulation regarding vertical agreements. The Com-
mission was able to adopt a broad Block Exemption Regulation to cover all
vertical restraints affecting finished or intermediate products and services,
including vertical agreements concluded by certain associations of retail-
ers.1 15 The Council Regulation extended the scope of Articles 1(1)(a) and
1(2)(b) of Council Regulation No. 19/65/EEC in order to enable the Com-
mission to cover, by block exemption regulation, all types of agreements
concluded between two or more firms, each operating at a different stage of
the economic process, with respect to the supply and/or purchase of goods
for resale or processing or with respect to the marketing of services.
1 16
Moreover, Article 1(4) of the Council Regulation (EC) No. 1215/1999
contains a procedural novelty which affects the competition procedural laws
in the Member States. According to Article 7(2) of Regulation No.
19/65/EEC, the competent authorities in the Member States now have the
authority, with respect to particular agreements or concerted practices to
which the block exemption regulation applies, to withdraw the benefit of
that block exemption regulation if the agreement has an effect which is in-
compatible with the conditions laid down in Article 81(3) of the Treaty. 17
Nevertheless, the new Commission Regulation is subject to certain
conditions. In particular, the Block Exemption Regulation will apply only
to firms whose market shares do not exceed a specific threshold of 30 per-
cent market share."' In order to increase the flexibility of the legal rules,
the Commission thereby limits the Exemption's availability to agreements
above this threshold. In addition, the Block Exemption excludes certain
fundamental restrictions, such as practices involving the imposition of fixed
Vertikalvereinbarungen, in EUROPAISCHE ZEITSCRIFT FUR WIRTSCHAFTRSRECHT 400,
400-404 (2000).
13 See Commission Regulation 1475/95, 1995 O.J. (L 145) 25, amended by Commission
Regulation 1582/97, 1997 O.J. (L 214) 27.
114 See Green Paper, supra note 7, at Introduction, para. 5. Selective distribution is a dis-
tribution system, whereby distributors are chosen on the basis of objective criteria necessary
for the efficient distribution of the goods in question. Selected distributors normally provide
some pre- or after-sales services and may only sell to final consumers or other selected deal-
ers. See id.
115 See Press Release, supra note 103.
116 See Council Regulation 1215/1999, art. 1(I), 1999 O.J. (L 148) 1.
117 It is surprising that this important part of the new legislation is not mentioned in the
official press release of the European Commission. See Press Release, supra note 103.
118 See Commission Regulation 2790/1999, art. 3(1), 1999 O.J. (L 336) 21, 23.
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or minimum resale prices, and certain forms of territorial protection that
may thwart the objective of market integration. 19
3. Guidelines
On May 24, 2000, the Commission adopted the Guidelines on Vertical
Restraints which complement the new Block Exemption Regulation. These
Guidelines are designed to allow a company to make its own individual as-
sessment of its respective market share and more generally of the vertical
agreements under the EC competition rules.120 Each case has to be evalu-
ated in light of its own facts and the Guidelines have to be "applied rea-
sonably and flexibly.'
21
The Guidelines indicate specific criteria that the Commission will ap-
ply in examinations of individual cases not covered by the Block Exemp-
tion. Furthermore, the Guidelines also cover the general criteria for
withdrawal of the Block Exemption in individual cases where an agreement
has effects incompatible with the conditions enunciated in Article 81(3).
Finally, the Guidelines detail the conditions for regulations displaying the
Block Exemption on a particular market.
The Commission hopes to reduce enforcement costs and as far as pos-
sible to eliminate notifications of agreements that do not give rise to any se-
rious competition problem. 122 The Guidelines are intended to cover two
issues, namely the application of Article 81(1) and 81(3) above the 30 per
cent market share cap and the Commission's policy on withdrawal of the
benefit of the Block Exemption, particularly in cumulative effect cases.
Agreements that do not fall under the amended Block Exemption Regula-
tion can be designed according to the guidelines in such a way that they can
be exempted individually. If the vertical agreement is objected to at a later
date, the affected enterprise is able to notify the Commission of the agree-
ment. The Commission then can adopt an exemption decision that takes ef-
fect on the date the agreement was concluded. Such a system will therefore
not punish those companies that may make mistakes in the assessment of
their market shares based upon the market share threshold.
In Chapter 11(2) of the new Guidelines, the Commission also comments
on agency agreements. This Chapter replaces the Commission's Notice on
19 Community competition law derives from the Treaty of Rome. Article 81 EC Treaty
prohibits agreements or concerted practices which restrict, prevent or distort competition
between Member States, except as exempted. See EC TmAT', supra note 2, at Article 81.
120 See Commission Notice - Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, ch. i, para. 5, 2000 O.J.
(C 291) 3. A question remains as to the "authoritative nature" of the Guidelines, not only for
the European Commission but also for national authorities and courts dealing with them.
See id.
121 See id.
2 See Commission Report, supra note 84, at 21.
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exclusive dealing contracts with commercial agents. 2 3  Competition re-
straints in agency agreements continue to be outside the scope of Article
85(1), as the agency relationship is genuine, i.e., the principal bears the full
financial or commercial risk.124
B. The New EC Rules for Vertical Agreements
The Commission intended the reforms to shift EC competition policy
from form-based requirements with sector-specific rules, to a more eco-
nomic approach in the assessment of vertical restraints covering virtually all
sectors of distribution equally. The new approach is based on the recogni-
tion that vertical agreements generally lead only to competition problems in
cases where weak interbrand competition and a certain degree of market
power exist. The focus therefore is on the "net" negative effect of agree-
ments. The new regulation is based on the fundamental goals of the pro-
tection of competition and market integration.'25
1. Substantive Provisions
With a very wide scope of application, 26 the new Regulation will ex-
empt from Article 81 all vertical restraints concerning intermediate and fi-
nal goods and services except for a limited number of "hardcore
restraints 12 7 contained in Article 3(a) of the new Block Exemption Regula-
tion.128 These restrictions include the imposition of resale prices and certain
types of territorial and consumer protections, leading to a partitioning of
markets. An agreement that contains one of these "hardcore restraints" will
' See 1959-1962 O.J. SPEC. ED. 139, 2921.
124 Whether the requirements are flfilled in a specific case is to be determined on the ba-
sis of the guidelines. See id.
125 In particular, it should focus on the following elements:
a general block exemption which may cover all types of vertical agreements;
a more economic approach to assessing the positive and negative effects of vertical re-
straints;
a reduction of the bureaucratic burden on the competition authorities and the undertak-
ings concerned;
adequate legal certainty for undertakings; and
an extended decentralization of control.
See id.
126 For more detailed comments on the application of the new Block Exemption Regula-
tion, see Guidelines, chap. III, paras. 21-70,2000 O.J. (C 291) 6-15.
127 See Communication from the Commission on the Application of the Community
Competition Rules to Vertical Restraints: Follow-up to the Green Paper on Vertical Re-
straints, §5 at para. 3, at http://europa.eu.inttcomm/competition/antitrustother.htm (last vis-
ited Feb. 15, 2001).
128 See Guidelines, chap. III, paras. 46-56, 2000 O.J. (C 291) 6-15. The previous block
exemption regulations, except the franchise regulation, covered only vertical agreements
concerning the resale of final goods and not intermediate goods or services.
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remove the entire agreement from the Block Exemption Regulation cover-
age.129 These restrictions are based on a "black list" approach, which defi-
nes what is not exempt under the Block Exemption rather than defining
what is exempt. Blacklisted restrictions are excluded from the scope of ap-
plication of the Block Exemption, but all restrictions not explicitly forbid-
den are now allowed under the new rules. Companies are advised not to
use these restrictions in their agreements, as they would be unlikely to
qualify for individual exemption and could attract fines.130
The Commission's goal in introducing such a list131 is the removal of
the strait-jacket-effect, which was at the center of the criticism of the old
regime's "white list" approach. In addition to this "black list," there are
certain restrictions that are not automatically exempted but that may, under
certain circumstances, nonetheless be incompatible with the EC competition
rules. The most important concerns non-compete obligations-requiring
distributors to resell only the brands of one supplier-when their duration
exceeds five years. 32 Such agreements are not covered by the Block Ex-
emption Regulation, as they are considered by the Commission to have a
strong foreclosing effect on the market.
The principal objective of a wide block exemption is to grant compa-
nies who lack market power a safe haven in which it is no longer necessary
for them to assess the validity of their agreements under the EC competition
rules. In order to preserve competition and to limit the extent of this ex-
emption to companies that do not have significant market power, the Ex-
emption Regulation establishes a single market share threshold to determine
the relevant market power beyond which companies may avail themselves
of the safe haven. The advantage of a single-threshold-system, in contrast
to a two-threshold-system that has also been proposed in the Green Paper, is
that there is no need to define specific vertical restraints other than hardcore
restraints. Additionally, the Commission has expanded the ruling of Article
4(2) of Regulation No. 17 on all vertical agreements. These agreements
therefore do not have to be registered with the Commission in advance but,
if necessary, can be exempted retroactively.
It must be stressed that for companies above the caps of the Block Ex-
emption there will be no presumption of illegality. 133 The market share cap
129 See Guidelines, chap. III. para. 46, 2000 O.J. (C 291) 11.
130 For the calculation of fines, see Council Regulation, supra note 30 and Commission
Guidelines on the Method of Setting Fines Imposed Pursuant to Article 15(2) of Regulation
No. 17 and Article 65(5) of the ECSC, 1998 O.J. (C 9) 3.
131 This list includes fixed resale prices or minimum resale prices, maximum or recom-
mended resale prices, territorial restrictions, customer's restrictions, the prevention of cross-
supplies, and the combination of different distribution agreements. See Commission Regu-
lation 2790/99, art. 4, 199 O.J. (L 336) 23.
132 See Commission Regulation 2790/1999, art. 5(a), 1999 O.J. (L 336) 24.
133 See Guidelines, chap. III, par. 62,2000 O.J. (C 291) 14.
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only serves to distinguish those agreements that are presumed to be legal
from those that may require individual examination and have to be notified.
The safe harbor of below 30 per cent market share offers companies the
freedom to create supply and distribution agreements best suited to their in-
dividual commercial interests and to adapt to the changing economic con-
ditions. The Commission offers the use of its Guidelines to assist
companies in carrying out their own assessment without notification.
According to Article 3(1) of the new Block Exemption Regulation, the
relevant market share is calculated on the basis of the supplier's market in
which it sells the contract goods or services. 34 The basis on which the
market share is calculated is the data of the preceding calendar year;135 all
connected undertakings of the respective undertaking are to be included in
this calculation.
136
The new Exemption Regulation includes one wide block exemption
regulation covering all vertical restraints affecting finished or intermediate
products and services. 137 This differs from the previous system of different
regulations for specific forms of vertical restraints or sectors.' 38  It thus
treats different forms of vertical restraints having similar effects in a similar
way, preventing unjustified differentiation between forms or sectors. In this
manner, the Commission intends to avoid a policy bias in the choices com-
panies make concerning their formats of distribution. The decision should
be based on commercial merit and not, as under the previous system, on the
particular clauses present in distribution contracts.
Moreover, the new "umbrella" Block Exemption Regulation No.
2790/1999 also covers franchising agreements. While franchising agree-
ments were defined in the old Block Exemption Regulation No. 4087/88,
they are not defined in the new Regulation. Only in the accompanying
Guidelines are franchising agreements described as agreements that contain
licenses of intellectual property rights relating to trade marks or signs and
134 The Block Exemption Regulation provides an exception for exclusive supply agree-
ments. See Commission Regulation 2790/99, art. 3(2), 1999 O.J. (L 336) 23. An exclusive
supply agreement is where the supplier is obligated to sell the goods or services to only one
purchaser. See id. at art. 1(c). In this case the buyer's market share is the relevant market
share.
135 See Commission Regulation 2790/99, art. 9(2)(a), 1999 O.J. (L 336) 24.
136 See Commission Regulation 2790/99, art. 11(1), 1999 O.J. (L 336) 25.
137 Including vertical agreements concluded by certain associations of retailers.
138 See Commission Regulation 1983/83 of 22 June 1983 on the Application of Article
85(3) of the Treaty to Categories of Exclusive Distribution Agreements, 1983 O.J. (L 173) 1;
Commission Regulation 1984/83 of 22 June 1983 on the Application of Article 85(3) of the
Treaty to Categories of Exclusive Purchasing Agreements, 1983 O.J. (L 173) 5; see also
Commission Regulation 1475/95 of 28 June 1995 on the Application of Article 85(3) of the
Treaty to Certain Categories of Motor Vehicle Distribution and Servicing Agreements, 1995
O.J. (L 145) 25 (expires 2002)
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know-how for the use and distribution of goods or services.139 According to
Article 2(3) of the Block Exemption Regulation, franchising agreements are
covered, provided the provisions that relate to the assignment to the buyer
of intellectual property rights do not constitute the primary object of such
agreements and are directly related to the use, sale, or resale of goods or
services by the buyer or its customers.
Therefore, franchising agreements will not be given preferential treat-
ment, as they involve a combination of vertical restraints, usually of selec-
tive distribution and non-compete obligations for the goods that form the
subject of the franchise.14 Sometimes exclusive distribution obligations
like a location clause or exclusive territory are also added.141 These combi-
nations would be treated according to the general criteria set out in the
Block Exemption Regulation, whereby ATP will, in any event, be under the
hardcore list. Related licensing provisions will be cleared, provided that
they are, first, necessary for or complementary to vertical restraints and,
second, not more restrictive than otherwise exempted provisions.
Furthermore, the new Block Exemption Regulation covers associations
of independent retailers that are established for the purpose of collectively
purchasing goods for final resale and supplying services to final customers
under a common format.' 42 To benefit from the Block Exemption, no indi-
vidual members of the association can exceed a turnover of Euro 50 mil-
lion. It is recognized that there are horizontal aspects to these associations,
and therefore the benefit of the Block Exemption is also subject to the pro-
vision that the horizontal aspects do not infringe Article 81. These hori-
zontal aspects will be examined in a manner that accords with the general
approach to vertical restraints as part of the review of the Commission's
policy on horizontal agreements.
The new Block Exemption Regulation contains, like the previous
Block Exemption Regulation No. 1983/83, No. 1984/83 and No. 4087/88, a
withdrawal mechanism from the presumption of legality for the rare cases
where a serious competition problem may arise involving parties that fall
below the market share threshold.'43 This withdrawal mechanism would, in
139 See Commission Notice - Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, adopted on May 24,
2000, para. 199, at : http://europa.eu.int/comm/dgO4/ententelother.htm.
1
40 A franchise is deftned as a package of industrial or intellectual property rights relating
to trade marks, trade names, shop signs, utility models, designs, copyrights, know-how, or
patents, to be exploited for the resale of goods or the provision of services to end-users. See
Commission Regulation 4087/88, 1988 O.J. (L 359) 46.
141 For the first time a Block Exemption Regulation contains provisions dealing with se-
lective distribution. However, these provisions do not deal with the legal validity of the se-
lection criteria, which is still determined by Art. 81(1) or the respective national law, if
applicable. See EC TREATY, supra note 2, at art. 81(1).
14 2 See Commission Regulation 2790/99, art. 2, 1999 O.J. (L 336) 23.
143 See Commission Regulation 2790/99, art. 6, 1999 O.J. (L 336) 24; see also Guidelines
on Vertical Restraints, supra note 120, at ch. IV.
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particular, be applied in cumulative effect cases. The Commission hopes to
ensure effective supervision of markets and greater decentralization in the
application of the Community Competition Rules.144 Furthermore, in order
to ensure greater decentralization in the application of the Community com-
petition rules, Article 7(2) of Regulation 19/65/EEC has been amended. 145
The new provision is designed to provide that where the effects of vertical
agreements are felt in a Member State that possesses all the characteristics
of a distinct market, the competent national authority may withdraw the
benefit of the block exemption in its territory and adopt a decision for the
purpose of eliminating those effects.146
Finally, in order to ensure effective control of the effects of parallel
networks of similar agreements on a given market, Article 7(1) of Regula-
tion No. 19/65/EEC was amended to allow the Block Exemption Regulation
to establish the conditions under which such networks of agreements are
excluded from its application. 47
2. Procedural Provisions
Under the previous system, in the absence of an applicable block ex-
emption, the Commission could grant an individual exemption only as of
the date when it was formally notified of an agreement.148 Under the new
system, when a company fails to notify the Commission because it has in-
correctly assessed its market share, it may be permitted at any time to apply
to the Commission for an individual exemption, which would apply retro-
actively.1 49 This proposal is designed to dissuade companies from seeking
individual exemptions unless they believe that they clearly exceed the mar-
ket share cap, and that their distribution arrangements have a significant ef-
fect on competition and are vulnerable to challenge. A notifying party does
not have to explain why the Commission was not notified of the agreement
earlier. The Commission emphasizes in its guidelines that such a party
"will not be denied retro-active exemption only because it did not notify
earlier., ,150
144 See Gerber, supra note 50, at 141-143.
145 See Council Regulation 19/65, supra note 100.
146 See Council Regulation 1215/1999 of 10 June 1999 amending Regulation 19/65 on the
Appli.ation of Article 81(3) of the Treaty to Certain Categories of Agreements and Con-
certed Practices, para. 11, 1999 O.J. (L 148) 3.
147 See Commission Regulation 2790/99, art. 6, 1999 O.J. (L 336) 24.
148 See Commission Regulation 17, art. 6(1), 1959-1962 O.L SPEC. ED (204) 89. The
nullity of the agreement was therefore at least final until this date of notification. Accord-
ingly claims for damages, which had been based on an infringement of Art. 81(1), could not
be enforced.
149 See Guidelines, chap. III, para. 63, 2000 O.J. (C 291) 14.
150 See id.
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In order to effectively dissuade companies from filing precautionary
notifications, however, there must be commercially acceptable time limits
within which the Commission can undertake to grant retroactive clearance
should notification for individual exemption appear necessary. In the case
that an agreement is challenged in proceedings before a national competi-
tion authority or court, the possibility of obtaining retroactive exemption
within a reasonable time is essential for the enterprises involved. The
Commission therefore gives priority to notifications for the enterprises in-
volved in litigation in national courts or complaints in its enforcement pol-
icy.1
51
The Commission will have the power to withdraw the block exemption
regulation, even in the case that a supplier falls below the market share
threshold when a sector is characterized by a small number of distribution
networks that have the combined effect of seriously restricting competition
in the market.' 52 Such a proposal, however, would not have retroactive ef-
fect, and the parties involved will be given six months to make the neces-
sary adjustments deemed necessary to maintain competition in the relevant
market.'
53
3. National Competition Authorities and National Courts
Due to the fact that the date of notification no longer limits the possi-
bility of exemption by the Commission, national authorities and courts have
to apply Article 81(1) above the market share cap by assessing the likeli-
hood of application of Article 81(3) in respect of all vertical agreements
falling within Article 81(1).' In response to concerns about these propos-
als, the Commission has sought to reassure industries that national authori-
ties and courts are accustomed to dealing with complex economic issues in
competition cases and that the Commission itself will endeavor to provide
guidance generally by increasing transparency concerning its own analysis
of cases under Article 81(1). This new rule is strongly opposed by the in-
dustries concerned, who favor the one-stop-shop approach in this area of
competition policy because of the danger of conflicts between EC and na-
tional legal systems and among the national legal systems. Such conflict
would enhance legal uncertainty for the companies. 55
151 See Guidelines, chap. III, para. 65, 2000 O.J. (C 291) 15.
152 See Commission Regulation 2790/99, art. 6, 1999 O.J. (L 336) 24.
153 See Commission Regulation 2790/99, art. 12(2), 1999 O.L (L 336) 25.
'- See Guidelines, chap. III, para. 64, 2000 O.J. (C 291) 15 (If such likelihood exists, the
national authorities and courts should suspend proceedings pending a position by the Com-
mission as is already practiced in cases where a notification is submitted at the time of entry
into force of the agreement.)
155 See discussion infra Section IV (describing the concerns of the beer, oil and chemistry
industries):
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C. Scope of the New Commission Regulation (EC) No 2790/1999
The new "umbrella regulation" covers virtually all sectors except for
the sector of motor vehicles156 and certain categories of technology trans-
fers.1 57 In particular, breweries and petrol companies, which often conclude
exclusive sales agreements, are affected by the reform of the policy in this
area. The previous block exemption regulations covered only the resale of
finished goods. The new regulations are the first block exemption regula-
tions dealing with the distribution of intermediate goods and services.
The Commission stated that, with regard to its proposals for the future
treatment of the motor vehicle distribution sector, it will reexamine this area
before deciding whether to maintain or abandon the present arrangements,
which will expire on September 30, 2002.158 During the discussions, before
the Council on the Commission's proposals, the Commission expressed
concern that the Member States might prejudge the choice of the future ex-
emption regime in this sector. Any exemption regime for motor vehicle
distribution after 2002 will be made after consultation with Member States
and interested parties. The Council has asked the Commission to convene a
meeting of the Advisory Committee immediately after having established
its report on the block exemption for the distribution of motor vehicles
scheduled for the year 2000. Article 11 of Regulation No 1475/95 requires
the Commission to draw up an assessment report by December 31, 2000 be-
fore a decision is made on the future exemption regime for the car sector. 59
The European Union's competition commissioner Mario Monti, however,
signaled in May of 2000 that he might seek radical changes to the current
regime in the car sector. 60 The commissioner pointed out that most of the
objectives of the existing rules had not been achieved due to a lack of re-
spect by the car manufacturers to the block exemption rules.
155 See Commission Regulation 1475/95 of 28 June 1995 on the Application of Article
85(3) of the Treaty to Certain Categories of Motor Vehicle Distribution and Servicing
Agreements, 1995 O.J. (L 145) 25 (expires 2002).
157 This is true, in particular, when these agreements involve the use of "know-how" or
patents. See Commission Regulation 240/96 of 31 January 1996 on the Application of Arti-
cle 85(3) of the Treaty to Certain Categories of Technology Transfer Agreements, 1996 O.J.
(L 32) 2. The subject matter of the Notice on subcontracting is outside of the scope of the
new Block Exemption Regulation. See 1979 O.J. (Cl) 2.
158 Reexamination will be in accordance with Commission Regulation 1475/95, 1995 O.J.
(L 145) 25. See also Antitrust and Trade Regulation 1908 (1999) 484.
159 Therefore the Commission has sent out questionnaires to parties involved in the motor
vehicle distribution trade intended to collect information about recent developments in the
specific distribution trade and achievement of the Regulation's objectives.
160 See Deborah Hargreaves, Monti Attacks Carmakers on Restrictive Sales, FIN. TIMES,
May 12,2000, at A2.
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D. Reform as Part of an Overall Reform of the Commission's Competition
Policy
The new Block Exemption Regulation (EC) No. 2790/1999 governing
vertical restraints is part of an overall reform of the Community's Competi-
tion Policy. The reform is designed to reach both the substantive and pro-
cedural rules applicable in all fields to modernize European competition
law: antitrust, mergers and state aids. 161 The basic objectives of the com-
prehensive reform are the more efficient enforcement of the EC competition
rules, the increased involvement of national competition authorities and na-
tional courts, the reduction of bureaucracy in the enforcement and the de-
velopment of a common competition culture in the EC. Other visual parts
of this reform next to the present reform in the vertical area are the White
Paper for a reform of Regulation No. 17162 and the Commission's recent
proposal for a regulation implementing Articles 81 and 82.163 It includes
the proposal to hand back decisions to national authorities in cases of price
fixing and abuse of dominant market power for all but the most important
cases, which will remain within the authority of the Commission's Compe-
tition DG.
Increasingly close partnerships are being formed between manufactur-
ers and distributors to ensure that the products are available when and
where consumers request, to maximize sales and to reduce waste.164 When
the new draft legislation was published, current European Competition
Commissioner Mario Monti stressed that:
This important reform project is well advanced and confirms the commitment
of the Commission to review and modernize Community rules on competition.
The aim is to simplify our rules and reduce the regulatory burden for compa-
nies, while ensuring a more effective control of vertical restraints implemented
by companies holding significant market power. This will allow the Commis-
sion to concentrate in the future on important cases, in co-operation with the
161 See Mario Monti, Address at the Formal Introduction Ceremony of the New President
of the Bundeskartellamt Festveranstaltung Pr'dsidentenwechsel Bundeskartellamt Bonn, at
http://europa.eu.int/rapid/startlegi/gies.. .ngettxt--gt&doc-=SPEECH/0/6//RAPID&Ig=EN
(Jan.13 2000).
162 See European Commission, White Paper on Modernisation of the Rules Implementing
Articles 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty, Commission Program No 99/027, at http://europa.eu.i
nt/comn/dgO4/entente/en/wbmodemisation.pdf (Apr. 4, 1999); see also Comments of the
Section of Antitrust Law of the American Bar Association on the European Commission's
White Paper on Modernisation of the Rules Implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the EC
Treaty, at http://www.abant.org/antitrust/eumodem.htm (Nov. 3, 1999). In this White Pa-
per, the Commission proposes to render Article 81(3) directly applicable and eliminate the
notification system for most transactions.
"' See Press Release IP/00/1064, European Commission, at http://europa.eu.int/en/com
m/competition/index_enhtnl (Sept. 27,2000).
164 See Vertical Reality, FIN. TIMES WEB-ARCHIVE, Dec. 22, 1999, at http://www.ft.c
om.
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Member States, who will play an increased role in the application of Commu-
nity competition rules.
65
The Commission's overriding concern is to promote and preserve inte-
grated and competitive markets in the EC and to implement an efficient and
effective competition policy in order to serve the consumer interest and
foster the competitiveness of industry, with special regard for small and
medium sized enterprises.1
66
E. Significance of Vertical Agreements to the European Community and
the Single Market
The regulation of vertical agreements has been of particular importance
to the Commission's competition policy since the first regulation in this
area.167  While national systems tend to focus generally on horizontal
agreements because they represent the most obvious distortions of the mar-
ket, the supranational system of the EC has focused on vertical restraints,
largely because they represent the most obvious obstacles to trans-border
trade. 68 Due to their strong links to market integration, vertical agreements
can be either positive or negative. Vertical agreements may promote effi-
ciency and market integration. The restraints contained in these agree-
ments, however, can also give rise to competition concerns. For example,
manufacturers that collectively have significant market power may be able
to tie up a large part of the distribution outlets in a country using exclusive
contracts. This could result in market foreclosure negatively affecting
competition and access to the market.169
165 See Press Release 1P199/699, European Commission, at http://europa.eu.intlen/comn/l
competition/indexen.html (Sept. 24, 1999).
166 See Green Paper, supra note 7, at 75, ch. VIII, pt. 271. "The Commission considers
that subject to cumulative effect and hardcore restrictions, agreements between small and
medium-sized undertakings as defined in the Annex to Commission Recommendation
96/280/EC, 1996 O.J. (L 107) 4, are rarely capable of appreciably affecting trade between
Member States or of appreciably restricting competition within the common market as long
as these undertakings do not hold a dominant position in a substantial part of the common
market." Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, supra note 120, at 3, ch. I, pt. 10.
167 See Green Paper, supra note 7, at i., Exec. Summary; see also Waller, supra note 33,
at 56.
'
68 See Waller, supra note 33, at 66-67; Tim Frazer, Competition Policy After 1992: The
Next Step, 53 MOD. L. REV. 609, 618-620 (1990).
169 The Court of Justice refers to foreclosure in the Delimitis case as to the "necessity to
examine whether there are real concrete possibilities for a new competitor to penetrate the
bundle of contracts." Case C-234/89, Delimitis v Henninger Brdu, 1991 E.C.R. 1-935.
Therefore, foreclosure can only said to occur when the cumulative effects of a parallel series
of agreements makes it difficult to enter the market and there are no concrete ways of by-
passing those agreements. See id.
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IV. RESPONSES TO THE REFORM OF VERTICAL RESTRAINTS
The reformation of the competition policy on vertical restraints has
caused a wide and diverse response not only from the businesses affected
by this amendment but also from the European Parliament, the Economic
and Social Committee and commentators. 7  In general, it is fair to say that
the overall reaction to the reformation process has been positive .71 The
general consensus is that it became apparent that it was time to change the
EC rules in this area of competition law. The previous blacklist approach
and the formalistic view of customer restrictions and selective distribution
reflected the EC's traditional preoccupation with intra-brand competition.
This preoccupation, which existed regardless of the level of interbrand
competition and whether or not the supplier had market power, was found
to be too long and complicated. 72 The general openness to the reform by
the business community was thus overshadowed by the fear of legal uncer-
tainty presented by the market share threshold in the new block exemption
regulation. 73 The business community's need for adequate legal security is
based on the aim to protect the investment made by the enterprises, to stay
competitive, and to plan and to avoid the burdens of speculative litigation.
Some companies demanded that the market share test be flanked with suffi-
cient measures to protect legal security. 174 Future experiences with the
Commission's guidelines will prove whether they will provide this protec-
tion.
75
During the reformation process, the Commission has reported on the
response to the call for wide reaching consultation among interest 
groups. 76
170 Both the European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee generally
welcomed the revision. See 1997 O.J. (C 296) 19; 1999 O.J. (C 101) 1; see also Carlin, su-
pra note 7, at 283.
171 See "CEFIC Comments on the Green Paper of the Commission on Vertical Restraints
in the EC Competition Policy". at http://www.cefic.be/position/sec/ppsecl4.htm (Mar. 14,
2000).
172 See id.
173 See EU Committee of the American Chamber of Commerce in Belgium, Business
Guide to EU Initiatives 1 (1998/1999) (on file with author).
174 See id.
175 The Confederation of Brewers in the Common Market ("CBMC") is very skeptical in
its evaluation of the impact of the draft guidelines. See Comments on the Draft Guidelines
on Vertical Restraints of November 22, 1999 (on file with author).
176 The Consultation phase of the policy reform had produced the following results:
97 per cent of those who answered believe the previous system was too legalistic and lacked an eco-
nomic approach;
42 per cent view vertical restraints as having a positive effect on competition and 50 per cent believe
that they have both a positive and a negative effect;
over half of the submissions favor the first two policy options mentioned in the Green Paper, though
many are open to compromise their positions;
nearly half believe market share to be a good indicator of market power, though difficulties remain
in the definition of the market share threshold; and
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Of the 227 written submissions, the large majority-64 per cent-have
come from companies or associations, while six consumer organizations
have responded to the call. 177 The majority of these companies and asso-
ciations hail from the beer and petrol industries. The primary concern has
been the maintenance of legal certainty, with only 41 submissions placing
the primary emphasis on the protection of competition.
Companies with market shares around 30 per cent will have to review
their previously block exempted trading activities to see whether they are
still block exempt, and thereafter may need to change or request specific
clearance of their vertical agreements. 178 The fundamental change in ap-
proach has shifted the balance away from minor agreements toward those
involving market power, and away from the form of the contracts and
clauses concerned toward their overall market effects. On the one hand,
there is a clear reduction of the regulatory burden for smaller companies,
who are clearly below the market share cap of 30 per cent. But on the other
hand, the new approach makes matters more complex for those companies
with market power.
Despite the reassurances that national authorities have dealt with com-
plex economic issues in the past, and even though the Commission has of-
fered guidance such as the recent Commission notice on the definition of
the relevant market, 179 some industries fear that overlapping jurisdiction
between multiple authorities may result in divergent views on market defi-
nition.180 This fear is bolstered by the fact that enterprises see a tendency
by national authorities and courts to define markets more narrowly than the
Commission itself1 81
The Union of Industrial and Employers' Confederations of Europe
("UNICE"), the European employers' body, predicts a positive effect for
numerous companies showed a willingness to consider a market share test, if it were flanked with
sufficient measures to protect legal certainty.
See Commission Communication, Summary of Reactions to the Green Paper, sect. ii., I (on
file with author).
177 See id.
178 See CEFIC Comments on the Green Paper of the Commission on Vertical Restraints
in the EC Competition Policy, at http://www.cefic.belpositionsec/ppsecl4.htm (Mar. 14,
2000).
179 See Commission Notice 1997 O.J. (C 372) 5 ( defining relevant market for purposes
of Community competition law).
"0 For the difficulties of a relevant market definition and the calculation of the market
shares, see Montag, supra note 89, at 837. With regard to national courts, however, it is im-
portant to keep in mind that the Commission's policy merely allows them to play the same
role as in all other areas of Community law, including the rules on abuse of a dominant posi-
tion, and on public undertakings, which are at least as difficult to apply as the rules on
agreements and concerted practices. See Monti, supra note 160.
1 See Paul Lugard, Notes for a Presentation at the IBC Global Conference at the Conrad
Hotel 5 (Oct. 13 1998) (on file with author).
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companies that invest in distribution networks and forecasts that ultimately
the reformation will have an effect on the way they sell their goods. How-
ever, the Union would have preferred to see a higher market share cap at 40
per cent.1
8 2
Particularly for larger enterprises with pan-European distribution net-
works, such as the beer, oil and chemistry sectors, the point of legal uncer-
tainty was an essential issue. In many cases, the argument was made that
defining the relevant market requires a complex economic analysis and is a
difficult exercise despite the Commission's "Notice on the Definition of
Relevant Market for the Purposes of Competition Law."' 183 The introduc-
tion of a market share threshold will oblige suppliers to monitor their mar-
ket shares constantly during the lifetime of each agreement, with a view to
notification, modification or termination if and when the critical level is
reached. This will be particularly burdensome when multiple products and
multiple geographic markets are involved, and the companies are concerned
with protecting their investments and avoiding the burdens of speculative
litigation.
8 4
The Confederation of Brewers in the Common Market ("CBMC")' 8s
lobbied to retain the previous supply contract system and its system of dis-
tribution, or tied-tenancy, in order to continue boasting the largest brewing
industry in the world.' 86 In this context the CBMC pointed out that fol-
lowing research conducted from 1989 to 1990, the European Commission
concluded that the block exemption in the brewery industry was "satisfac-
tory" for all parties and should not be changed. 8 7 The main concerns ex-
pressed by the CBMC in its comments on the reformation include the
introduction of the market share cap, the duration of contracts in Article 4
of the block exemption regulation, the issue of leased and owned premises
and the transitional period of nineteen months in Article 12. All of these
concerns lead back to the consequence of the potential lack of legal secu-
rity.
The two main types of the beer delivery contract, the loan system and
the tenancy or leasehold system, seek to stimulate hundreds of thousands of
full- and part-time jobs by providing financing and expertise to individual
182 See Brussels to Ease Rules, supra note 20.
..3 See 1997 O.J. (C 372) 5; see also, Lugard, supra note 180, at 3.
194 See Statement by EUROPIA, at http://www.europia.com/Retailing/html/rules.htm (last
visited Mar. 14, 2000).
185 The Confederation of Brewers in the common market represents the national brewing
industry associations of the 15 European Union Member States, plus Switzerland and Nor-
way.
186 See European Information Service, European Report 2316 (on file with author); see
also CBMC Comments on the Draft Commission Regulation (Oct. 21, 1999) (on file with
author). But see Carlin, supra note 7, at 285.
187 See European Information Service, European Report, supra note 185.
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establishments. They are also designed to ensure high quality products and
service by supplying modem equipment and professional support. These
issues, plus the benefits from a more efficient distribution system, e.g., cost
reduction for customers, are viewed to be in danger due to the reform.
Furthermore, the Confederation predicted a shift in the dynamic of the
brewing market because brewers with market shares around the threshold
will focus their future investments more on brand promotion rather than on
individual relationships with cafds, bars and restaurants. The consequence
would be a disadvantage for medium-sized breweries who cannot afford the
same level of investment. Additionally, the new umbrella block exemption,
in contrast to the previous Regulation No. 1984/83/EEC, does not take into
account the particularities and specifics of the European beer market. The
CBMC also denied the consequence of a reduction of notifications pursuant
to the reform, due to the fact that large companies that wish to continue to
use the beer delivery contract would have to notify the Commission of their
agreements in order to receive the Commission's decision in this matter.188
The European Government Affairs Organization of the Oil Refining
and Marketing Industry ("EUROPIA"), opposed the introduction of the
market share cap test.18 It emphasized the risk of introducing greater legal
uncertainty, which would only be alleviated by costly and time-consuming
applications for individual exemption of agreements. 190 The organization
emphasized three main negative consequences of the policy reform. The
first was further vertical integration-petroleum suppliers buy previously
dealer-operated service stations and instead use their own employees to
manage those service stations. The second was a reduction of investment in
dealer-operated service stations, in effect forcing dealers to find alternative
sources of finance. Lastly, in cases where companies do not wish to make
investments on the basis of agreements which are subject to legal uncer-
tainty, application to the EC Commission for individual exemption would
be onerous for petroleum suppliers and for the Commission's services.'
91
The European Chemical Industry Council ("CEFIC") also emphasized
its major interest in the enhancement of legal security. Although such an
uncertainty would remain embodied in the prospect of a market share test
given the difficulty in assessing market share, the organization regards a
188 See id.; CBMC Comments, supra note 185.
189 See Statement by EUROPIA, supra note 184; see also Written Question 3619/97 of
Ricardo Garosci to the Commission About the Situation of Fuel Retailers, 1998 O.J. (C 174)
88.
'90 The organization sees an "excessive legal uncertainty", which is an "inherent impreci-
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"market share test as attractive."'192 The Council welcomed the fact that the
new block exemption covers all kinds of vertical restraints and that the re-
quirement to notify industrial supply agreements of this kind is distinctly
limited.
V. CONCLUSION
The Commission's approach represents a significant departure from
the existing rules on vertical agreements. The broadening of the scope to
cover services, industrial supply arrangements and the like is welcomed by
most interested parties. By treating different forms of vertical restraints
having similar effects in a similar way, the new rules will avoid any policy
bias in the choice of the specific distribution format. The inclusion of a
market share threshold was not welcomed by industry, but looked inevita-
ble.1 93 And, as the Commission pointed out in its Communication, market
shares are not an unknown phenomenon in the EC competition rules.194 For
companies that fall below the market share cap, the new rules were wel-
comed. For those that exceed or come close to the threshold, their approach
to the new rules is not as clear. The new regime will involve a long-
overdue simplification of the rules for many businesses and allow Commis-
sion officials to investigate more effectively other, more "dangerous" areas
of competition policy. But leaving it to companies to determine their indi-
vidual market share also creates a degree of uncertainty, especially for en-
terprises with a market share close to or above the market share cap of 30
per cent.195 However, a more economic approach is unfortunately incom-
patible with absolute legal security.
The introduction of market share caps implicitly introduces an element
of legal uncertainty hinging on the issue of how to define the relevant prod-
uct and geographic market in any given case. The possibility of retroactive
exemptions falling under Articles 4(2) and 6(2) of Regulation No. 17 for all
vertical agreements not falling within the block will mitigate part of this le-
gal uncertainty. Without the obligation to notify in advance in order to ob-
tain the benefit of an individual exemption ex tunc, the undertakings will
not carry the risk of having operated under a void agreement. Finally, it
192 See CEFIC Comments on the Green Paper of the Commission on Vertical Restraints
in the EC Competition Policy, at http://www.cefic.belposition/sec/ppsecl4.htm (last visited
Mar. 14,2000).
193 The inclusion of a market share threshold system was inevitable due to a lack of viable
alternatives to this system.
1
94 See Commission's Communication, supra note 127, at § IV, para. 2. Note the 15 per
cent market share in Article 4(2) of Regulation No. 17, supra note 23, the 10 percent market
share creating a presumption of negative clearance in the Notice on Agreements of Minor
Importance, supra note 72, and the 25 per cent market share threshold creating a presump-
tion of negative clearance in the Merger Regulation, Council Regulation 4064/89, 1989 O.J.
(L 395) 1-12, amended by Council Regulation 1310/97, 1997 O.J. (L 180) 1-6.
195 See Commission Regulation 2790/1999, 1999 O.J. (L 336) 21, 23.
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does remain doubtful whether the whole reform will significantly reduce
the Commission's workload by the cases falling within the block exemp-
tion, and not simply shift them from the Commission to the national
authorities and back again to the Commission.
Although it is too early to reach a sophisticated conclusion about the
present EC reform on vertical restraint, and only practice with the new rules
will show whether the Commission has met the goals it set for itself, the ef-
forts undertaken by the Commission in its analysis of this area of competi-
tion law and the wide consultation exercises give rise to an optimistic view
of the future.
